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BRIEF REPORT
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Inequity aversion can be defined as the refusal of gains or strong, negative emotional behavior when there is an unfair distribution of outcomes (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999). Aversion to inequity may be investigated by the use of an inequity game, an experimental procedure derived from the economic
games literature (see McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis,
& Warneken, 2017). In this game, an allocation is
distributed between two players (Player One and
Player Two) by an experimenter. If Player One
accepts the allocation, both players receive their
allocated payoffs. If Player One rejects the allocation, neither player receives a payoff. Rejection of
an unequal distribution may be used as a measure of inequity aversion. Inequity aversion may
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occur in situations of disadvantageous inequity
(DI), in which one rejects an outcome that is less
than that of a partner. Inequity aversion may also
occur in situations of advantageous inequity (AI),
in which one rejects an outcome that is more than
that of a partner.
With respect to the ontogenesis of humans’
“sense of fairness”, there seem to be important
differences between aversion to DI and AI (Blake
et al., 2015; McAuliffe, Blake, Kim, Wrangham, &
Warneken, 2013; Corbit, McAuliffe, Callaghan,
Blake, & Warneken, 2017). Children across diverse societies show aversion to DI as young as 4
years old (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al.,
2015; McAuliffe et al., 2013; Shaw & Olson, 2012).
In contrast, emergence of aversion to AI is more
variable. Blake et al. (2015), for example, found
evidence of AI in older children (8 years old) in
some countries (the US, Canada, and Uganda),
but not in other countries (India, Mexico, Peru,
and Senegal). Aversion to AI may be more related
to social cues and cultural context than aversion
to DI, in that it is strongly observed and varies
less between people from different cultures and
individuals from different species, such as humans and monkeys (e.g., Blake et al., 2015;
Brosnan & de Waal, 2014). In this paper, we ask
if flexibility of aversion to DI may be best investigated with experimental procedures with more

EAHB Bulletin

long-lasting opportunities to interact with a partner.
There is interesting empirical evidence showing that more long-lasting opportunities to interact with a partner may have a strong influence on
social behavior in test conditions (Abreu-Rodrigues, Natalino, & Aló, 2002; Avalos, RibesIñesta, Ortiz, & Serna, 2015; Marwell & Schmitt,
1975; Ribes-Iñesta, Rangel, Pulido, Valdez, Ramírez, Jiménez, & Hernández, 2010; Schmitt, 1998;
Silverstein, Cross, Brown, & Rachlin, 1998). Typically, there is no programmed cost for social interactions, but outcomes can vary due to some aspects of a partner’s behavior and the experimental condition. In this kind of experimental
strategy, there are usually at least two experimental conditions, and participants may experience repeated interactions with a given partner
under stable conditions before there is a change
in experimental conditions. For experimental
purposes, dyadic interactions may be controlled
when one member of the dyad is a confederate.
An example of a procedure that involves a
long-lasting opportunity to interact with a partner is a puzzle task that can be shared with another person (Avalos, Ribes-Iñesta, Ortiz, &
Serna, 2015; Ribes-Iñesta, Rangel, Pulido, Valdez,
Ramírez, Jiménez, 2010). The participant and a
partner (who is a research confederate) need to
solve puzzles, presented on individual computer
screens that show both the participant’s puzzle
and the confederate’s puzzle. The participant and
confederate can put pieces on their own puzzle as
well as on the other puzzle. If the participant or
the confederate places a piece on their own puzzle, he/she receives 10 points. In addition, if the
participant or confederate places a piece on the
other person’s puzzle, they may both receive 10
points (points delivery varied between studies).
Participants (college students) rarely put pieces
on the confederate’s puzzle when confederates
put pieces only on their own puzzles in baseline
sessions. Across experimental conditions, the
percentage of pieces that the confederate placed
on the participant’s puzzle varied from 0 to 25,
50, 75, and 100%, in ascending or descending order. Results showed that participants placed
pieces on the confederate’s puzzle in the same
proportion as the confederate placed pieces on
the participants’ puzzle. The flexibility of cooperative strategies has also been investigated by
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Silverstein, Cross, Brown, and Rachlin (1998).
The study used a two-phase procedure with an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Participants
were initially assigned to one of four experimental conditions in which they played with a
confederate, and the confederate’s strategy varied: (1) tit-for-tat, (2) play randomly, (3) always
cooperate, or (4) always defect. In a second phase,
participants played the prisoner’s dilemma game
with each other (instead of with the confederate).
During this latter condition, cooperation was the
predominant strategy mainly for those participants previously exposed to the tit-for-tat condition.
Collectively, experimental results indicate
that different cooperative behaviors may be flexible in social situations, which requires a special
analysis regarding the learning mechanisms involved when one person’s decisions may be affected by the other person’s behavior. The main
aim of the present study was to devise a twophase experiment to investigate flexibility of
aversion to DI in young adults as a result of dyadic interactions with AI. We investigated
whether aversion to DI could be modulated by a
previous experimental history in which a confederate acted in a “friendly” manner that produced
AI. We compared this situation with two control
situations: one in which participants interacted
with an “unhelpful” partner who did not permit
AI and one in which participants did not have
previous experience with a partner (they were exposed directly to the DI test).
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-nine college students, ranging in age
from 18 to 27 years, were recruited from a university campus: 33 were female and 26 were male.
All participants signed informed consent forms
that had been approved by a Brazilian research
ethics
committee
(process
CAAE:
19646713.4.0000.5561).
Experimental Environment and Materials
The experiment was conducted in a research
room at the University of São Paulo. In the room,
there were two tables and two chairs, a folding
screen, and a whiteboard (Figure 1). The experimenter was stationed next to the whiteboard and
had visual access to the participant and
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confederate. The participant and the confederate
sat at separate tables, and visual contact between
them was limited by a folding screen positioned
between them. They could only see each other’s
hands, which card the other person played on
each trial, and the outcome presented by the experimenter on the whiteboard. The participant
and confederate each had a blue and a green card,
and there was a space marked on each table indicating where they needed to place the chosen
cards on each trial. They also had access to a pencil and notepad, on which they could write whatever they wanted. In a pre-experimental phase
with four trials, all participants learned general
rules about choosing cards, combinations of
cards and outcomes, and the payoff matrix for
different combinations of cards.
Figure 1
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There were 29 participants in the FRICON
group, 15 participants in the UNHCON group,
and 15 participants in the NOHIST group. In the
FRICON group, 14 participants were excused
from the experiment before Phase DI due to failure to meet the Phase AI criterion (see below).
Data from these participants were not included in
the overall data analysis. Participants in the
NOHIST group only completed the test for DI
(Phase DI).
Experimental Task and Payoff Matrix
On each trial, the outcomes for the participant and confederate were determined by the
combined choices of blue and/or green cards.
When the participant and confederate both chose
the blue card, there was an inequitable outcome.
When one or both choose a green card, there was
an equitable outcome. In Phase AI, inequity was
advantageous to the participant; in Phase DI, inequity was disadvantageous to the participant
(Table 1).
When the participant entered the experimental room, the confederate was already sitting
in one of the chairs, behind the screen. Written instructions were given to the participant and confederate simultaneously. The experimenter asked
that instructions be read in silence. The instructions were:

Note. An overhead illustration of the experimental setting.

Procedure
The participants were randomly assigned to
one of three experimental groups: friendly confederate (FRICON), unhelpful confederate
(UNHCON), or control/no previous history
(NOHIST). Fifteen participants in the FRICON
group and all participants in the UNHCON
group completed two experimental phases: In the
first phase (labeled Phase AI), a history with a
friendly or unhelpful confederate was manipulated. In the second phase (labeled Phase DI), the
production of DI was tested.

This study is not about intelligence, and it is
not about assessing your intellectual abilities.
When you’re done, you’ll get more explanations. You will be working with a partner, and
both of you will have an identical task to perform. You and your partner will receive two
cards (one blue and one green). When the experimenter says the word “Attention,” you
must make a choice: place your hand on the blue
card or place your hand on the green card. After
your choice, the experimenter will say the word,
“Now!” At this point, put the chosen card in
the place indicated on your desk so that you and
your partner can see each other’s choices. On
each trial, you will receive a certain number of
points. The number of points you will receive
depends on your choice and the choice of your
partner. The experimenter will notify you when
the session is finished. Please remain seated and
do not talk to your partner or the experimenter

EAHB Bulletin
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Table 1.
Payoff Matrix for Participants and Confederates in Phases AI and DI
PHASE AI
Advantageous Inequity to the Participant
Card combinations

Points
P

C

Confederate’s Choice

Trials

FRICON

Blue-Blue*

5

2

Blue

15

UNHCON

Blue-Blue*

5

2

Green

15

NOHIST

(not exposed to this experimental phase)
PHASE DI
Disadvantageous Inequity to the Participant
Card combinations

ALL GROUPS

Blue-Blue*

Points
P

C

2

5

Confederate’s Choice

Trials

Blue

12

*Any other combination produced equal outcomes: 2 points to both players.
“P” refers to participant and “C” refers to confederate.

during the session. All instructions are contained
on this sheet. If you have questions, reread the instructions (do not ask the experimenter any questions). When you’re ready to begin, raise your
right hand.
After returning the paper with the general instructions, the participants received the following specific instructions, also printed on paper:
If you choose the blue card and the participant
beside you also chooses the blue card (combination: blue–blue), you will earn five points and
the participant next to you will earn two points.
If you or your partner choose the green card
(combinations: blue–green, green–blue, or
green–green), you both will earn two points.

Experimental Design
After the participant read the general and
specific instructions, there was a pre-experimental phase that consisted of four trials. The
confederate alternately chose the green and blue
cards on these trials (i.e., green-blue-green-blue).
The outcome on these trials was the same as that
in the next phase: inequity favorable to the participant in cases in which both players chose the
blue card, and equity with any other card combination. The objective of this pre-experimental
phase was to permit the participants to test the
instructions about card choices and points distributions. After the four trials, the experimental
phase was initiated without any notification.
Phase AI: advantageous inequity to the participant. In this phase, the confederate’s behavior
varied depending on the participants’ experimental group. The confederate’s behavior was
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pre-determined in order to permit or prevent inequity favorable to the participant. In the
FRICON group, the confederate used the blue
card and allowed the participant to earn five
points while the confederate earned two points
on every trial. In the UNHCON group, the confederate used the green card and did not allow
the participant to earn five points (i.e., both the
participant and confederate earned two points)
on every trial. There were 15 trials in this phase.
For participants in the FRICON group, there was
a criterion to finish the phase: Participants were
only exposed to the next phase if they played the
blue card on at least 10 trials, and the blue card
was played on the last three trials.
Phase DI: disadvantageous inequity to the participant. At the beginning of this phase, the experimenter provided additional written instructions
to the participant and confederate on how to earn
points. These instructions indicated that the payoff matrix was reversed: now blue-card choices
resulted in the confederate earning five points
and the participant earning two. On every trial
for all groups, the confederate always chose the
blue card. There were 15 trials in Phase DI. This
phase included the NOHIST group that received
only the preliminary, general instructions about
gains; also, this group was only exposed to Phase
DI and thus did not have an experimental history
with a friendly or unhelpful partner.
Data Analysis
The data file was organized in long format.
Each data file record (each choice for each participant) contained the following variables: participant identification (ID), participant’s choice
(green, blue) (PC), phase (1, 2) (Phase), group
(FRICON, UNHCON, NOHIST) (Group), and
block (1, 2, 3) (Block). The total number of records
was 1125.
The dependent (outcome) variable was PC,
and category Green was the reference category.
A full factorial generalized linear mixed model
with binomial distribution and logit link function
(repeated measure logistic regression) was used
to test the main variables. Fixed effects for factors
Phase and Group was controlled by random effect of ID.
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RESULTS
Our main purpose with this experiment was
to see if dyadic interactions with a confederate
constrain aversion to DI for FRICON participants
(compared to participants in UNCOHN and
NOHIST groups). Our first analysis compared
participants in the three experimental groups in
two consecutive phases (AI and DI).
Figure 2 depicts the results from the two
phases for participants in FRICON and
UNCOHN groups and from Phase DI for participants in NOHIST group. Closed markers show
estimated marginal means and open markers
show individual participant data in each phase.
Considering participants in the FRICON group,
there was a small decrease in blue choices in
Phase DI. For these participants, blue choices
were still more frequent than green choices in the
second phase. For Participants in the UNCOHN
group, in contrast, the percentage of trials on
which participants chose the blue card dropped
to close to 40% in Phase DI, indicating an unwillingness to produce DI. The NOHIST group
showed strong variability in choices: Some participants choose the blue card on most of the trials, but other participants choose the green card
on most of the trials. This result clearly illustrates
the importance of previous experience with AI
regarding the more consistent data in Phase DI
for participants in the FRICON and UNCOHN
groups.
For statistical comparisons, we adopted a significance level of 0.05. The interaction effect was
significant, F (1, 1120) = 25.354, p < 0.001. There
was a simple main effect of Group for both
Phases DI and AI, F (1, 1120) = 6.691, p = 0.01 and
F (2, 1120) = 46.787, p < 0.001, respectively. Using
pairwise contrasts in Phase DI, the differences
among the levels for groups FRICON,
UNHCON, and NOHIST were significant
(FRICON - UNHCON: t (1120) = 9.373, Sidak adjusted p < 0.001, FRICON - NOHIST: t (1120) =
2.535, Sidak adjusted p = 0.011, and UNHCON NOHIST: t (1120) = 3.639, Sidak adjusted p =
0.001). The estimated marginal means (adjusted
proportion of blue card choices) were 0.928 and
0.689 in Phase AI for groups FRICON and
UNHCON, respectively, and were 0.799, 0.083,
and 0.482 in Phase DI for groups FRICON,
UNHCON, and NOHIST, respectively.
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Figure 2

Note. Blue and green choices in Phases AI and DI for participants in the FRICON and UNCOHN groups and in Phase
DI for participants in the NOHIST. Closed markers show estimated marginal means and open markers show individual
participant data in each phase. Error bars indicate confidence intervals of 95%.

Figure 3 depicts the difference between
groups in Phase AI in three blocks of five trials.
Examining the data in smaller trial blocks shows
whether differences between the FRICON and
UNHCON groups in Phase AI occurred at the beginning of the experiment or were established
during that phase. At the beginning of the experiment, participants from both groups chose the
blue card on a similar number of trials initially,
but they differed in the second and third block.
Specifically, participants in the FRICON group
began to make more blue-card choices, whereas
those in the UNHCON group tended to make
slightly fewer blue-card choices.
DISCUSSION
Our results clearly show that previous personal history (Phase AI) affected decisions in a
situation with DI. We clearly constrained aversion to DI for FRICON participants. We were able
to see this by comparing FRICON participants
with UNHCON participants and also by comparing these groups with the NOHIST group (parti-

cipants who were not exposed to Phase AI).
These results are very strong and consistent, even
with a relatively small number of participants in
each experimental group. Another way to conceptualize these results is that participants who
experienced a friendly confederate in Phase AI
(i.e., a partner who permitted AI to the participant) produced DI to themselves in Phase DI.
Our experimental strategy was successful in
demonstrating how flexibility in inequity aversion may be produced in a two-phase experiment. The primary contribution of this strategy is
that a majority of previous reports in the experimental literature test inequity aversion using just
a few trials presented in a single condition that
are part of between-group strategies. There are,
however, some limitations in our analysis that
may be improved in future investigations. The
main limitation is related to the criteria for advancing participants in the FRICON group to
Phase DI: this criterion was used only for participants in that group, which may have biased the
comparisons between groups in the Phase AI.
The use of the same criteria for all participants in

EAHB Bulletin

32

Vol. 32

Figure 3

Note. Difference between groups in Phase AI in three blocks of five trials

the initial phase may produce more comparable
results in different conditions.
The results of Phase DI resemble a “tit-fortat” situation that is common in behavioral
games like the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1984). Research on reciprocity has created an
interesting discussion related to the evolution of
cooperation and has contributed to quantitative
models of social behavior and cultural evolution
(Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Developmental
and cultural mechanisms may explain changes in
inequity aversion at different age stages or group
levels, respectively, but they are less predictive in
dealing with the fact that inequity aversion may
be established or constrained within the repertoire of a given individual. For this reason, crosscultural variation about fairness is sometimes
hard to interpret and open to discussion about
which psychological or cultural mechanisms are
at work (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby,
2010).
Our results may help integrate contributions
from learning principles (usually described as
content-independent processes) with evolutionary mechanisms that promote sociality (usually
described as content-dependent processes;

Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Questions about learning are usually best investigated by using procedures that permit long-lasting interactions between participants in a cooperative task before a
test. The literature on associative learning phenomena, for example, has repeatedly illustrated
that learning rarely occurs in just one or a few trials and often requires long-lasting interactions
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Reciprocity and inequity aversion may be strongly explained by
evolved mechanisms. However, at the same time,
the results from Phases AI and DI suggest a cumulative effect of learning during the dyadic interactions. This effect may be also partially explained by the principles of stimulus control (Sidman, 2000; Urcuioli, 2013) because in Phase AI
the confederate’s behavior (blue or green choices)
is a condition associated with different rates of
point’s delivery. The effects of arousal (Killeen,
Hanson, & Osborne, 1978) may also aid in understanding differences between participants in
FRICON and UNHCON groups: Arousal refers
to the cumulative activation of behavior by the
presentation of outcomes (e.g., points gained on
each trial of a game) that can only be fully observed once participants have had multiple exposures to the same type of trial (Killeen & Sitomer,
2003).
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As in other fields of psychology, the question
is not about “innate” versus “acquired,” but, rather, is a matter of identifying mechanisms and
how those different mechanisms work and are integrated (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2005). This
is an exciting avenue to explore because it permits reconciliation of a genetic disposition to behave in a cooperative manner with the role of personal experience.
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